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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

The present appeal addresses the very narrow issue of whether appellant,
Bernardino Barraza, has vendee' s lien rights that can still be enforced against a parcel of
property located in Parma, Idaho.

This is the only remaining issue in litigation

attempting to quiet title to the subject property, which litigation has encompassed two
lawsuits and lasted more than five years.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below

This is the second appeal of case numbered 2009-8175 from the District Court of
the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon. The
first appeal was from the district court's grant of Wilfrido Cuevas' s 1 two motions for
summary judgment: the first holding that the prior default judgment quieting title to
appellant Barraz.a void and of no force and effect, and the second holding that there was
insufficient evidence to support any of Barraza's claims to the property or against
Wilfrido, including Barraza's claims for unjust enrichment.
By order dated March 22, 2012, this Court affirmed the district court's decision
that the prior judgment quieting title in Barraza's name was void and affirmed the district
court's decision denying Barraza's claim for unjust enrichment. This Court reversed that
portion of the district court's judgment quieting title to Wilfrido because Barraza
demonstrated factual issues regarding whether Wilfrido took title pursuant to Barraza' s
statutory claim for a vendee's lien and remanded to the district court for consideration of
that narrow issue.
1

In an effort to comply with I.AR. 35(d) and avoid any possible confusion caused by identical surnames
of Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas and his predecessor in interest, Mr. Juan Cuevas, Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas, the
Respondent in this case, will respectfully be referred to as "Wilfrido."
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On remand, Wilfrido brought summary judgment on Barraza's claim of a
vendee's lien on the grounds that the unenforceable agreement for the purchase of real
property cannot give rise to a vendee's lien and, alternatively, that the statute of
limitations bars Barraza' s vendee' s lien claim. The district court, the Honorable Molly J.
Huskey presiding, granted Wilfrido's motion for summary judgment and again entered a
judgment quieting title in Wilfrido's name. This appeal followed.
C.

Concise Statement of Facts

The facts relative to the present appeal, none of which are in dispute, are as
follows:
The district court held that the alleged purchase agreement by and between
Barraza and Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the subject property was unenforceable
because it did not comply with the statute of frauds (Tr. (Vol. l) 96:22-97:10) and
granted Wilfrido's motion for summary judgment, quieting title in Wilfrido's name free
and clear of any interest held by Barraza. While this Court did not expressly rule on the
statute of frauds issue, it explained in a footnote that Barraza's claim for specific
performance, to the extent one was made, was "simply not viable" noting that "it is not
readily apparent that the contract between the parties complies with the statute of
frauds .... " Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 896, 227 P.3d 337, 343 n. 4 (2012).
Barraza has not challenged any of the rulings that the alleged purchase agreement does
not comply with the statute of frauds and that issue has not been presented on this appeal.
To the extent that any purchase agreement existed between Barraza and Juan
Cuevas, the two parties agreed to rescind it and Barraza vacated the property. R. 000030.
On May 2, 2002, Barraza filed a notice of lien reflecting the rescission agreement. R.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2

000030. Wilfrido Cuevas filed the present action to quiet title on August 7, 2009. R.
000001. Barraza answered, setting forth facts which allegedly give rise to his claimed
vendee's lien, on August 28, 2009. R. 000001.
II.
A.

RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Under Idaho's vendee's lien statute does a vendee's lien arise when the

underlying agreement for the purchase of real property is invalid and unenforceable
because it does not comply with the statute of frauds.
B.

If an invalid purchase agreement does give rise to a vendee's lien, does a mutual

agreement to rescind the invalid agreement trigger the running of the statute of
limitations for enforcing any such vendee's lien.
III.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Wilfrido seeks attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121
and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.
IV.

ARGUMENT

This Court has two separate and distinct bases upon which it can affirm the
district court's decision denying Barraza's claimed vendee's lien.

First, because the

underlying purchase agreement does not comply with the statute of frauds and is,
therefore, invalid that purchase agreement cannot give rise to Barraza's claimed vendee's
lien. Second, even if an invalid purchase agreement can create a vendee's lien, Barraza's
rights to enforce the alleged vendee's lien are time barred because Barraza's and Juan
Cuevas's mutual agreement to rescind the invalid purchase agreement is the event that
triggered the running of the limitations period on Barraza's vendee's lien. For these
reasons, Wilfrido respectfully requests that this Comi affirm the decision of the District
Court quieting title to the property in Wilfrido.
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A.

The district court properly held that a vendee's lien cannot attach to an
invalid contract.
Idaho Code Section 45-804 provides that a vendee's lien exists where, under an

agreement for the sale of real property, a purchaser pays to the seller a portion of the
purchase price and there is a subsequent failure of consideration. The first question
presented in this case is whether Idaho Code Section 45-804 gives rise to a vendee's lien
when the purchase agreement upon which the lien claimant relies is invalid because it
violates the statute of frauds. Because recognizing a vendee's lien where the underlying
purchase agreement is invalid would circumvent the statute of frauds and create an
interest in property where there is incompetent evidence to show that a purchase
agreement existed, this Court should hold that a vendee's lien only exists where the
underlying purchase agreement is valid.
Idaho courts of appellate review have not yet addressed the question of whether
an invalid purchase agreement can give rise to a vendee's lien. However. the dissenting
opinion in Shepard v. Dougan, which was decided on other grounds, supports the
argument that the purchase agreement contemplated by Idaho Code Section 45-804 must
be a valid purchase agreement.
[The statute] is intended to apply to cases of contract for
the purchase of real property and is meant to protect the
vendee, where he makes a payment on an agreed purchase
price; and for some reason or other the vendor either is
unable to give a title or refuses to comply with his
agreement to do so and the consideration for the contract
fails. But I am unable to find any case where the lien
provided for in this statute has been extended . . . to an
incomplete contract or a so-called vendee who attempted to
purchase under a void contract. ...
58 Idaho 543, 564, 76 P.2d 442, 450 (1937) (Ailshie, J., dissenting).
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A contract for a deed, which are absolutely void from the
beginning because of the fact that the vendor is entirely
lacking in power and authority to transfer the premises,
cannot be the foundation for a vendee' s lien any more than
they could be the foundation for any other legal or
equitable interest in the premises.
Id. at 567, 76 P.2d at 452 (Ailshie, J., dissenting) (quoting 0 'Neill v. Bennett, 49 S.D.

524, 207 N.W. 453) (italics omitted). This Court's order dated March 22, 2012, noted
that Barraza's claims for specific performance were not viable because "the record
discloses several seemingly insurmountable obstacles to such a claim"-namely, that the
alleged purchase agreement did not comply with the statute of frauds.

Cuevas v.

Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 896, 277 P.3d 337, 343 n.4 (2012). Based on the rationale set

forth in the Shepard dissent, this Court should hold that an invalid purchase agreement
that will not support a claim for specific performance is also insufficient to give rise to a
vendee's lien. Accordingly, Wilfrido requests that this Court affirm the district court's
decision that the invalid purchase agreement between Barraza and Juan Cuevas does not
give rise to Barraza's claimed vendee's lien.
B.

The limitations period on Barraza's vendee's lien began to run on or before
the date Barraza filed his claim of lien: May 2, 2002.

If this Court rejects the arguments set forth above and holds that a purchase
agreement that does not satisfy the statute of frauds can still give rise to a statutory
vendee's lien, Barraza's claims must still fail because the statute of limitations has run on
Barraza's right to enforce such vendee's lien.
Whether the statute of limitations time bars Barraza's right to enforce any alleged
lien is dependent on which event triggers the running of a limitations period. Barraza
argues that the event that triggers the running of the limitations period was Juan Cuevas' s
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quiet title lawsuit, filed on April 2, 2007, because that is the date that Barraza became
aware that Juan Cuevas had breached the parties' agreement rescinding the invalid
purchase agreement.

App. Br. 7.

Conversely, Wilfrido argues that the appropriate

triggering event (if any) is the date Barraza and Juan Cuevas mutually agreed to rescind
the invalid purchase agreement, which Barraza acknowledged by vacating the property
and filing a lien.
Idaho courts have not specifically identified the event which triggers the running
of the statute of limitations on a claim for a vendee's lien. However, the vendee's lien
statute provides valuable guidance as it protects the vendee "in case of failure of
consideration." IDAHO CODE § 45-804. "The term 'failure of consideration' includes
instances where a proper contract was entered into when the agreement was made, but
because of supervening events, the promised performance fails, rending the contract
unenforceable." World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884, 728 P.2d
769, 773 (1986) (citations omitted).

Based on this statutory language, the right to

2

enforce a vendee's lien arises, and thereby begins the running of the limitations period,
when the promised performance--delivery of title to the vendee-is no longer
enforceable. 3
In this matter, the alleged agreement for the purchase of the property was never
enforceable because it violated the statute of frauds. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890,
896, 277 P.3d 337, 343 n.4 (2012). Nevertheless, and even though the original purchase
agreement was invalid, Juan Cuevas and Barraza mutually agreed to rescind the invalid
2

A vendee's lien comes into existence at the time of payment of any part of the purchase price. Benz v.
D.l. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 225, 268P.3d1167, 1177 (2012).
3
It does not appear as though a mutual contract for rescission is properly characterized as the failure of
consideration which gives rise to a vendee's lien rights. See, generally, Hoverson v. Evans, 38 ldaho 428,
224 P. 1067 (1923) (discussing the nature ofa mutual contract for rescission of real property and refusing
to read into such contract a requirement that the vendor repay any amounts paid to the vendee).
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purchase agreement. R. 000030. If the invalid purchase agreement was sufficient to give
rise to a vendee's lien, the mutual rescission of the invalid purchase agreement was an
additional event that rendered the invalid purchase agreement unenforceable.
Accordingly, the rescission agreement is the event best characterized as the "failure of
consideration" that would trigger the running of the limitations period.
While the record does not indicate when Juan Cuevas and Barraza mutually
agreed to rescind the invalid purchase agreement, Barraza memorialized the rescission
agreement by filing the notice of lien claim on May 2, 2002 (R. 000030), so the mutual
rescission had to have occurred sometime prior to that date. Accordingly, pursuant to the
undisputed record evidence, as of May 2, 2002, the invalid purchase agreement had been
rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, and the limitations period for Barraza to
enforce his vendee's lien rights began to run on or before that date.
In an effort to save his vendee's lien from the statute of limitations, Barraza
argues that the triggering event for limitations was the date Juan Cuevas breached the
rescission agreement by filing a lawsuit to quiet title.

In support of this argument,

Barraza cites to the Court of Appeals Decision in Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517,
198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008) ("the five-year statute of limitation for Barraza to
bring this breach of contract claim began to run when Barraza became aware of the
breach. The breach alleged in Barraza' s answer occurred when Cuevas filed the instant
quiet title action-April 2, 2007."). App. Br. 7. However, Barraza's argument is not
supported by Idaho's vendee's lien statute, which provides relief only when there is
failure of consideration on a purchase agreement. In this case, Barraza and Juan Cuevas
mutually rescinded the invalid purchase agreement; if filing a quiet title action on April 2,
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2007, was a breach of any agreement, it was a breach of the rescission agreement, not the
invalid purchase agreement. Accordingly, this Court should reject Barraza's argument
that Juan Cuevas' alleged breach of the rescission agreement is the event that triggered
the limitations period for Barraza's vendee's lien.
If Barraza did have an agreement for the purchase of real property sufficient to

give rise to a vendee' s lien, such agreement was rescinded, by mutual asset of the parties,
sometime on or before May 2, 2002. Because the mutual rescission created yet another
reason why the invalid purchase agreement could not be enforced, that event triggered the
running of limitations on Barraza' s vendee' s lien rights. Wilfrido, therefore, requests that
this Court hold that Barraza rights to enforce his vendee's lien are time barred under all
possible limitations periods and on such grounds, affirm the decision of the district court.
V.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly ruled that Barraza does not have and cannot enforce
vendee's lien rights.

First, Barraza and Juan Cuevas did not have an enforceable

agreement for the purchase of real property that would give rise to a vendee's lien under
Idaho Code Section 45-804. Second, even if a vendee's lien can arise under an otherwise
invalid purchase agreement, because the invalid purchase agreement was rescinded by
mutual agreement of the parties on or before May 2, 2002, the limitations period for
Barraza to enforce his vendee's lien rights expired and any lien rights that Barraza did
have are now time barred. For these reasons, Wilfrido respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the decision of the District Court quieting title in Wilfrido' s name.
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Dated this

1st

day of July, 2013

RAINEY LAW OFFICE

By

;c---ra

Rebecca A. Rainey - Of the'J.'.U.i.u-

Attomey for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
st

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 day of July, 2013, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
Hall, Friedly & Ward
340 E. 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, ID 83647
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l;tJ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

